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Abstract—This paper addresses the security of distributed 
secondary control of inverter-based Distributed Energy Resources 
(DERs) in microgrids. The proposed cyber-secure scheme utilizes 
the Weighted Mean Subsequence Reduced (WMSR) algorithm at 
each DER to discard the corrupted information received from 
neighboring DERs. This algorithm requires the connectivity of 
underlying communication graph to be above a specific threshold. 
To cope with this requirement, a methodology is proposed such 
that each DER is able to virtually change the quality of 
communication links connected to that DER to enhance the 
connectivity of communication graph. Two islanded microgrid test 
systems are simulated to validate the effectiveness of proposed 
cyber-secure secondary control. 
 
Index Terms—Cyber-attacks, distributed control, microgrids, 
secondary control, WMSR algorithm.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ICROGRIDS are controllable power systems that are 
able to supply their local loads through the available 
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) [1]. DERs can be of 
electric machine type like synchronous generators or inverter-
based type to facilitate the integration of emerging resources 
such as fuel-cells, battery energy storage systems, and solar 
energy. The unique feature of microgrids is their ability to 
operate autonomously after preplanned and/or unplanned 
islanding. Microgrids are equipped with a hierarchical control 
structure, including primary, secondary, and tertiary controls, 
to support the reliable operation in both grid-connected and 
islanded modes [2]-[3]. This paper considers the secondary 
control level. 
Conventionally, secondary control level is implemented 
through a centralized control structure in which all DERs 
communicate and share their local information with a central 
controller. Centralized secondary control has a reliability 
bottle neck related to the single point of failure at the central 
controller. More recently, distributed secondary control has 
gained much attention because of increased flexibility, 
reliability, and scalability [4]-[13]. In this paper, distributed 
secondary control is of concern. 
Microgrids hugely utilize information and communication 
technologies which in turn expose them to cyber-threats. In 
[14], cyber security of microgrids is proposed as one of the 
concepts that should be considered for an outlook of higher 
resilience. In a microgrid control system, both control and 
communication entities can be potential targets for cyber-
threats (See Fig. 1) [15]-[22]. False data injection (FDI) 
attacks target the sensors and control and decision-making 
units which in turn corrupt the data transferred through the 
communication links and impact the microgrid data integrity 
[23]. Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks endanger the availability 
of communication system services [24]. This paper focus is on 
FDI attacks targeting the control and decision-making units of 
DERs. FDI attacks can endanger microgrid voltage and 
frequency stability which in turn (i) cause cascading failures 
and power outage for microgrid customers [25], (ii) slow 
down the DER control system responses, (iii) make DERs 
synchronize to values other than actual voltage and frequency 
reference values, and (iv) overload DERs or violate the 
microgrid equipment thermal limits.  
The majority of the research performed in the power grids 
cyber-security is on the cyber-attack detection [15]-[21]. In 
[13], the cyber-attack mitigation of AC microgrids is 
addressed which only focuses on frequency restoration and 
does not address the microgrid voltage and DERs’ 
active/reactive power control. In [15], a cyberattack mitigation 
scheme is proposed for the reliable operation of voltage 
control protocols in an AC microgrid. In [16], a methodology 
is presented for discarding the information of attacked agents 
in the control protocols which needs a communication graph 
with high connectivity.  
This paper proposes a secure intrusion mitigation approach 
for microgrid distributed control system that uses the 
Weighted Mean Subsequence Reduced (WMSR) technique. 
The proposed secondary control is inspired by the WMSR-
based mitigation technique proposed in [15], [26]. The WMSR 
is a systematic technique to discard the information shared by 
non-cooperative attacked agents in a multi-agent network. The 
WMSR technique requires the communication graph to meet a 
minimum connectivity criterion for providing consensus 
among agents in the presence of cyber-attacks. To achieve the 
connectivity requirement, this paper introduces the concept of 
virtual communication graph in which the communication 
links’ qualities are calculated based on DER’s relative power 
angles. To this end, an exponential-based function is selected 
to define the quality of communication links based on the 
DER power angles which controls the flow of information and 
can stop the information flow if the power angle of 
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2 
neighboring DERs significantly diverge from each other. A 
control protocol is proposed to tune up the quality of 
communication links to ensure that the communication 
graph’s algebraic connectivity is above a specific cyber-secure 
threshold. Once the cyber-secure threshold is satisfied the 
WMSR technique is applied to restore frequency and voltage 
of microgrid to the nominal values.  
This paper makes the following contributions:   
• The concept of time-varying communication graphs is 
utilized to improve the microgrid resilience with respect 
to cyberthreats. 
• Cyber-secure control protocols are proposed for the 
reliable operation of frequency/active power and 
voltage/reactive power control of DERs in an islanded 
microgrid which enhance the connectivity of 
communication graph and effectively discard the 
corrupted information distributed by attacked DERs.    
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Preliminaries of 
graph theory are provided in Section II. The DER model, 
primary control, and secondary control of microgrids are 
discussed in Section III. The cyber-secure distributed 
secondary control is presented in Section IV. Section V 
discusses the communication and control requirements to 
implement the proposed cyber-secure distributed control 
system. The validity of the proposed secondary control 
protocols is verified in Section VI. A conclusion is provided in 
Section VII.  
 
Fig. 1. Cyber-attacks on DERs or communication links in microgrid 
distributed control system. 
II. PRELIMINARIES ON GRAPH THEORY 
The microgrid communication network can be modeled by 
a communication graph. A graph ( , , )=  includes a set 
of N  nodes 1 2{ , , , }Nv v v=   and a set of edges   . 
The nodes and edges of a communication graph are shown in 
Fig. 2. In a microgrid system, DERs denote graph nodes and 
communication links denote graph edges. A graph is 
represented by an adjacency matrix [ ]
N N
ija
=  to 
describe the connectivity of nodes. An edge from node j  to 
node i , denoted by ( , )j iv v , indicates the information flow 
from node j
 
to node i. 
ija  
is the weight of edge ( , )j iv v , and 
0ija   if  ( , )j iv v  , otherwise 0ija = . The neighbors of 
node i  in a set is described as { | ( , ) }i j iN j v v=  . The 
Laplacian matrix is defined as L D= − , where the in-
degree matrix, diag{ } N NiD d
=  , elements are defined as 
ii j N ij
d a=  [27].  
III. MICROGRID PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROL 
In this section, first, an inverter-based DER dynamical 
model is presented. Then, microgrid primary control level is 
discussed. Finally, the centralized and distributed secondary 
control levels are elaborated. 
A. Dynamic Model of an Inverter-based DER 
An inverter-based DER includes the Voltage Source 
Inverter (VSI) and the internal power, voltage, and current 
controllers to regulate the DER terminal voltage and operating 
frequency. The internal voltage and current control loops 
control the terminal voltage of DER to match it with the 
reference provided by power controller. The detailed 
description of these internal control loops is provided in [6]. 
This paper models DERs in d-q (direct-quadrature) 
reference frame [6]. In the reference-frame theory, the d-q 
reference frame of i-th DER is rotating with the angular speed 
of ωi. This angular speed corresponds to the DER operating 
frequency. It is assumed that microgrid and one of the DERs 
are formulated in the common reference frame with the 
angular speed of ωcom. The power angle (or reference frame 
angle) δi denotes the angle difference between i-th DER and 
common reference frames satisfying  
 .i i com  = −  (1) 
In practice, each DER power angle can be measured using a 
Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) [28] which utilizes an 
internal Phase-Locked Loop (PLL) system [29]. The power 
angle δi and its relationship to d-q reference frame is shown in 
Fig. 3. Inverter-based DERs in an AC microgrid are shown in 
Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 2. A sample communication graph with nodes and edges. 
 
Fig. 3. The power angle δi and its relationship to d-q reference frame. 
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B. Primary Control Level 
The primary control level is a local DER control. It 
conventionally employs the droop techniques to regulate the 
DER frequency through the active power and DER voltage 
magnitude through reactive power. The frequency and voltage 
droop techniques are  
 
,
i ni Pi i
o magi ni Qi i
m P
v V n Q
 


= −
= −
, (2) 
where Pi and Qi are the output active and reactive power of 
DER; ni  and Vni are the frequency and voltage droop 
references; mPi and nQi denote the Pi and Qi droop coefficients, 
respectively. vo,magi is the output voltage magnitude of DER 
[2]. The droop coefficients are proportionally calculated based 
on the active/reactive power ratings of DERs to ensure that the 
DERs’ active/reactive powers are assigned accordingly, i.e., 
 
max
max
max
max
,
j j Pi
i i Pj
j j Qi
i i Qj
P P m
P P m
Q Q n
Q Q n

= =


 = =


 
 (3) 
where max iP / max iQ  and max jP / max jQ  are the active/reactive 
power ratings of i-th and j-th DER, respectively. Since 
frequency is a global variable, DERs’ active powers are 
allocated based on DER ratings using the droop technique in 
(2). On the other hand, since voltage is not a global variable in 
the microgrid (i.e. each bus has a different voltage 
magnitude.), allocation of reactive powers based on DER 
ratings depends on the microgrid circuit topology and loading 
condition. 
C. Secondary Control 
The secondary control is to restore the operating frequency 
and terminal voltage magnitude of DERs to the reference 
frequency and voltage, i.e., i ref →  and ,o magi refv V→ . 
ref  is set to 2π×fnom, where fnom is the nominal frequency of 
microgrid. For secondary voltage control, vref is chosen such 
that the voltage magnitude of a critical bus of microgrid 
synchronizes to microgrid nominal voltage vnom. The 
microgrid critical buses host the critical loads and 
infrastructure which require to operate at the microgrid 
nominal voltage. To this end, vref is calculated as 
 ,( ) ( ) ,ref p nom c,mag i nom c magv k v v k v v dt= − + − (4) 
where vc,mag denotes the critical bus voltage magnitude; kp and 
ki denote the proportional and integral PI controller 
parameters. 
Secondary control level tunes DER primary control inputs, 
i.e., ωni and Vni in (2). Secondary control must ensure that 
DERs’ active/reactive powers are allocated based on a pattern 
similar to primary control [7]-[12].   
The conventional secondary control utilizes a central 
control which communicates to DER primary controls using a 
centralized communication structure. The central control is 
exposed to the single point of failure which endangers the 
reliability of secondary control. Alternatively, distributed 
secondary control has been proposed in the literature which 
utilizes distributed control protocols implemented on all 
DERs. DERs can communicate with each other through a 
distributed communication network and share their local 
information with neighboring DERs to reach a consensus on 
the operating frequency and voltage of microgrid [5]-[12].  
The distributed secondary control of a microgrid including 
N DERs is described as the synchronization problem for the 
following first-order multi-agent system to adjust the primary 
control inputs:  
 1,..., ,
ni i
ni vi
v
i N
V v
 =
=
=
 (5) 
where iv  and viv  are the distributed control protocols 
formulated using the local information of each DER and its 
neighbors’ information and can be written as [11] 
( ) ( )
( ) ,
(
)
i
i
i ij i j i i ref
j N
ij Pi i Pj j
j N
v c a g
a m P m P
     


= − − + −
+ −


 (6) 
, , ,( ) ( )
( ) ,
(
)
i
i
vi v ij o magi o magj i o magi ref
j N
ij Qi i Qj j
j N
v c a v v g v v
a n Q n Q


= − − + −
+ −


 (7) 
where c  and vc  are the frequency and voltage control gains, 
respectively. The pinning gain 0ig   is nonzero for only one 
DER.  
IV. CYBER-SECURE MICROGRID DISTRIBUTED CONTROL 
This section formulates the proposed cyber-secure 
distributed secondary control based on WMSR technique.  
A. Cyber-threat Analysis 
In a microgrid system, both control and communication 
entities can be potential targets for cyber-threats. FDI attacks 
target the sensors and control and decision-making units 
which in turn corrupt the data transferred through the 
communication links and impact the microgrid data integrity. 
On the other hand, DoS attacks target the communication links 
and tamper the transfer of data. If a communication link is 
subjected to a DoS attack, the performance of distributed 
secondary control is not affected as long as the underlying 
communication graph is strongly connected. In a strongly 
connected graph, there is a path for the flow information 
between any two distinct DERs. This paper focus is on FDI 
attacks targeting the sensors and control and decision-making 
units of DERs. Due to the extensive deployment of 
communication and control technologies and the presence of 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), microgrid control 
system is vulnerable to cyber-threats. For example, FDI 
attacks can simply gain access to the PMUs, IEDs, or DER 
control and decision-making units through the communication 
ports and tamper the algorithms and functionalities of these 
devices to cause a major catastrophe in microgrid. 
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Fig. 4. Inverter-based DERs in an islanded microgrid. 
 
Fig. 5. Attack tree for FDI threat analysis. 
A DER is healthy (cooperative) if it successfully runs the 
distributed control protocols in (6) and (7), and shares its 
actual measurements with the neighboring DERs. On the other 
hand, a corrupted (non-cooperative) DER is exposed to an FDI 
attack where the attacker takes control of DER sensors and 
control unit. In Fig. 5, an attack tree for FDI threat analysis is 
provided. As seen, the FDI attack can tamper either the DER 
sensors (measurement units) or actuators (control and 
decision-making unit). The measurement units include the 
local CT and PT or PMUs. The attacker can gain access to 
these measurement units and send false data to DER internal 
control and decision-making unit. On the other hand, an 
attacker can directly tamper the control and decision-making 
unit on each DER to change control protocols or control 
parameters. More specifically, FDI attacks on DERs can 
endanger the operation of distributed secondary control and 
have the following impacts on the microgrid operation, 
• endangering microgrid voltage and frequency stability 
which in turn causes power outage for microgrid 
customers, 
• slowing down the DER control system responses,  
• making DERs synchronize to values other than actual 
voltage and frequency reference values, 
• overloading DERs and violating the microgrid equipment 
thermal limits. 
B. Virtual Time-Varying Communication Graph 
Conventionally, microgrid distributed control utilizes a 
fixed adjacency matrix, [ ]
N N
ija
=  , i.e., the 
communication link qualities are time-invariant values. This 
paper proposes to adopt a virtual communication graph in 
which the communication link qualities, aij, are virtually and 
locally calculated by each DER. Each DER determines the 
quality of communication links connected to that DER (See 
Fig. 6). To this end, an exponential-based Communication 
Link Quality (CLQ) function [26] is implemented at each 
DER. The CLQ function provides each DER with a set of 
weighting factors to apply to the data that DER transmits 
through the distributed communication network. This paper 
proposes the following CLQ function based on the DER 
power angles, δi, as   
max 1
2
1
max
2 1
0
( )
exp( ) otherwise,
 
 
  
 − 

 − 
= 
 − − −
 
 −
i j
i j
ij
i j
a R
R
a
R
a
R R
(8) 
where R1 and R2 describe the relative power angle thresholds 
acting as measures to reflect the health of microgrid control 
system. If DERs’ power angles are relatively close to each 
other, microgrid operates in a healthy condition in terms of 
frequency stability. Therefore, this threshold is set as a 
relatively small value. If power angle difference between two 
neighboring DERs is less than R1, the communication link 
between them virtually adopts a maximum value of amax. 
Depending on the communication graph topology, amax is 
selected based on the criteria explained in Section IV.C. As 
the power angle of communicating DERs diverge, the 
microgrid stability is at a higher risk. The CLQ function 
exponentially decreases communication link quality until the 
difference between the power angles is more than R2 and the 
communication link quality is forced to zero, i.e. the flow of 
information between two DERs is prevented. R2 should be 
chosen large enough to reflect the risk of microgrid frequency 
instability when the power angles of two neighboring DERs 
are diverging.   is a CLQ design parameter to tune the 
smoothness and shape of function. The relationship between 
  and CLQ function smoothness is shown in Fig. 7.  
C. Cyber-secure Microgrid Distributed Control Using WMSR 
Technique 
In a multi-agent system, the WMSR algorithm objective is 
to enhance the security of system with respect to cyber-threats 
by discarding the information from attacked agents in a 
systematic manner [30]-[31]. The communication graph must 
meet a specific connectivity criterion to ensure the reliable 
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operation of distributed control system. Theorem 1 discusses 
this connectivity requirement for WMSR technique. 
Definition 1 [26]: A communication graph is called r-robust if 
for any of two disconnected subsets, at least one subset is r-
reachable. A subset is r-reachable if for at least one DER, the 
number of communication links leaving the subset from that 
DER is larger than r. 
Theorem 1 [30]: A microgrid with N DERs and a 
communication graph ( , )=  is considered. Assuming nNC 
non-cooperative attacked DERs, WMSR technique provides 
asymptotic consensus for DERs if the communication graph is 
(2nNC +1)-robust.    
To implement WMSR technique, each DER performs the 
following stages at each time step: 
Stage 1: At each DER, a list of angular speeds and voltage 
magnitudes from the neighboring DERs, i.e., j  and ,o magjv , 
ij N , is created. This list is sorted based on j  and ,o magjv  
values.   
Stage 2: j  and ,o magjv  of neighboring DERs are compared 
with DER’s i  and ,o magiv  to update the distributed frequency 
and voltage control protocols as follows:  
• For angular frequencies, if there are nNC or more larger j  
values, the nNC largest j  values are discarded from the 
distributed control protocol in (6). If there are fewer than 
nNC larger j  values, all of them are removed from (6). For 
smaller j  values, the same process is utilized to discard 
the neighboring j  values. After the removal process is 
done, the distributed frequency control protocol in (6) is 
updated as 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ,
(
)
i
i
i ij i j i i ref
j R
ij Pi i Pj j
j R
v c a g
a m P m P


     


= − − + −
+ −


 (9) 
where iR  describes the updated neighboring set in 
distributed frequency control protocol for i-th DER. 
• For voltage magnitudes, if there are nNC or more larger 
,o magjv  values, the nNC largest ,o magjv  values are discarded 
from the distributed control protocol in (7). If there are 
fewer than nNC larger ,o magjv  values, all of them are 
removed from (7). For smaller ,o magjv  values, the same 
process is utilized to discard the neighboring ,o magjv  values. 
After the removal process is done, the distributed voltage 
control protocol in (7) is updated as 
, , ,( ) ( )
( ) ,
(
)
vi
vi
vi v ij o magi o magj i o magi ref
j R
ij Qi i Qj j
j R
v c a v v g v v
a n Q n Q


= − − + −
+ −


 (10) 
 
Fig. 6. Virtual communication graph imposed by DERs. 
 
Fig. 7. CLQ function for different values of  . 
where Rvi describes the updated neighboring set in distributed 
voltage control protocol for i-th DER.    
As stated in Theorem 1, WMSR technique ensures 
frequency and voltage restoration if the communication graph 
of microgrid control system is (2nNC +1)-robust. According to 
[32], finding the r-robustness of a graph is a co-NP complete 
problem. This significantly increases the computational 
burden of distributed control system in microgrids with large 
number of DERs. Theorem 2 presents an alternative metric 
that lower-bounds the r-robustness metric.  
Theorem 2 [26]: For a communication graph ( , )= , 
2
2
 
 
 
 lower-bounds the level of r-robustness, r. 2  denotes 
the algebraic connectivity of communication graph .  
From Theorems 1 and 2, the WMSR technique can provide 
frequency and voltage restoration if 
 2 4 .NCn   (11) 
Equation (11) is a cyber-secure threshold to guarantee WMSR 
technique effectiveness in the presence of nNC attacked DERs. 
To this end, amax in (8) is selected such that the algebraic 
connectivity of the communication graph assuming all links 
adopting the fixed weight of amax is greater than 4nNC. 
Moreover, since the virtual communication graph link quality 
values are a function of DER power angles, the following 
control protocol is used to satisfy (11) before the WMSR 
technique is applied 
 
2
2 ,i
i
v c 



=

 (12) 
where is 
2
c  control parameter, iv  is the auxiliary frequency 
control variable in (5) , and i  is the power angle of i-th DER. 
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6 
It should be noted that (12) should be fast enough to force the 
algebraic connectivity of virtual communication graph above 
the cyber-secure threshold in (11) in a few cycles. Doing so, 
the microgrid can recover to normal operation after the attack 
is detected. The control parameter 
2
c  is the key parameter to 
tune the response speed of (12). As 
2
c  is set to larger values, 
the response speed of control protocol in (12) increases 
accordingly.  
The algebraic connectivity is a function of Laplacian matrix 
L. According to [33], the derivative of algebraic connectivity 
with respect to Laplacian matrix is  
 2 2 2
2 2
( )
,
T
T
L
L

=

v v
v v
 (13) 
where v2 is eigen vector related to 2 . L is a function of the 
power angle of DERs according to (8). Using the chain rule, 
the control protocol in (12) can be written as [26] 
 
2
2 2
2 2
Trace .
T
T
i T
i
L
v c 

     
=    
      
v v
v v
 (14) 
Remark 1. Equations (12) or (14) ensure that the DER power 
angles are pushed toward a more stable operating region 
which in turn increases the communication links’ qualities and 
the algebraic connectivity of communication graph. It is 
proven in [26] that (12) or (14) increase the algebraic 
connectivity of communication graph to reach the cyber-
secure threshold in (11) in definite time.  
This paper proposes the following algorithm for the 
secondary control of microgrids in the presence of cyber-
attacked DERs. In this algorithm (Algorithm 1), each DER 
estimates the communication graph algebraic connectivity and 
compares it with 4 NCn , where   is a factor to provide 
enough margin for algebraic connectivity to remain above the 
cyber-secure threshold in (11). If the algebraic connectivity is 
less than 4 NCn , the control protocol in (14) is applied until 
the algebraic connectivity is greater than 4 NCn . If the 
algebraic connectivity is greater than or equal to 4 NCn , the 
WMSR technique is utilized to update the distributed 
secondary control protocols in (6) and (7) by discarding the 
information of corrupted DERs over time. The proposed 
cyber-secure distributed secondary control is shown in Fig. 8. 
Algorithm 1: Cyber-secure distributed secondary control 
for t = 0,T,2T,… do 
     if 2 4 NCn    then 
           update iv  in (5) using (14), 
           force viv  in (5) to zero. 
     else 
           use WMSR algorithm, 
           update iv  in (5) using (9), 
           update viv  in (5) using (10). 
     end if 
end for 
 
Fig. 8. Cyber-secure distributed secondary control at each DER. 
D. Distributed Estimation of Algebraic Connectivity 
The proposed methodology requires each DER to know 
algebraic connectivity of the overall communication graph to 
switch between the control protocol in (14) and WMSR 
algorithm. One approach could be to utilize a central 
coordinator that oversees the communication graph, calculates 
the algebraic connectivity, and shares it with all DERs. 
However, the presence of a central coordinator exposes the 
secondary control to the single-point-of failure issue. To 
incorporate a fully distributed control platform and avoid the 
requirement of any central coordinator, this paper utilizes a 
two-layer distributed algebraic connectivity estimation 
approach [34] which is elaborated as follows. The algebraic 
connectivity can be estimated locally at i-th DER using 
 
2, 1
2,
2,
ˆ (( 1) )
ˆ( ) ( ) ,
ˆ ( )
i s
i s i s
i s
k T
kT W kT
kT
  −
+
=
v
v
 (15) 
where 2,ˆ iv , the estimated i-th element of v2, is updated with 
sampling period of sT  using the outer-layer observer 
2,
2, 1,1
ˆ (( 1) )
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ˆ ( )
i
i s
T
ij s j s i s i s N
j Ni s
k T
a kT kT kT W kT
W kT

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+ =
 
 −
 
 

v
v 1
(16) 
where ˆiW  denotes the outer layer observer tuning variable; 
N1  is the vector of one with N  elements; 1̂diag =     with 
1̂  defined as the estimated first left eigenvector of adjacency 
matrix; 1,ˆ i  denotes the i-th element of 1̂ . The inner-layer 
consists of two observers that update ˆiW  and 1̂  estimations 
with the sampling period of 
*
s sT T . 
ˆ
iW  is updated at each 
DER using  
* * *ˆ ˆ( ( 1) ) ( ) ( ),
i
i s s ij s s j s s
j N
W kT l T a kT lT W kT lT

+ + = + + (17) 
1̂  is updated at each DER using 
* * *
1 1
ˆ ˆ( ( 1) ) ( ) ( ),
i
s s ij s s s s
j N
kT l T a kT lT kT lT 

+ + = + + (18) 
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V. CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
REQUIREMENTS TO IMPALEMENT THE PROPOSED DISTRIBUTED 
SECONDARY CONTROL 
The proposed distributed secondary control consists of 
control and communication layers. To facilitate the practical 
implementation of microgrid distributed control system, some 
technical factors and requirements should be taken into 
consideration on both control and communication 
infrastructure.    
A. Control Infrastructure Requirements 
The control infrastructure includes the local sensors and 
decision-making units located on individual DERs. The 
distributed control protocols for each DER can be 
implemented on the existing micro-processor of VSIs with a 
software update to pre-existing codes and do not impose heavy 
processing burden. As mentioned earlier, this paper focuses on 
the FDI attacks on the individual DER decision-making units. 
The proposed cyber-secure distributed control can be 
implemented by creating two software modules on the internal 
processor of VSIs. These software modules are to estimate the 
algebraic connectivity of the communication graph and 
implement the cyber-secure distributed control algorithm 
shown in Fig. 8. 
B. Communication Infrastructure Requirements 
In this section, the communication infrastructure 
requirements from standard, protocol, and technology points 
of view are taken into consideration.  
The communication system standard should account for the 
interoperability requirement. This requirement ensures that 
IEDs, e.g., inverters and control equipment, from different 
manufactures that support different communication protocols 
can be easily integrated into the rest of communication 
system. The IEC 61850 standard [35] is an industry-approved 
option to promote the interoperability of IEDs in microgrid 
distributed control system. The interoperability feature of IEC 
61850 standard facilitates the seamless data transfer among 
microgrid control, monitoring, and protection systems [36]. 
The information flow among DERs can be in the format of 
GOOSE messages to transfer DER local measurements like 
voltage, frequency, and active/reactive power over the 
distributed communication network. Each DER acts as a 
publisher while the neighboring DERs on the communication 
network act as subscribers.  
The TCP/IP based communication protocol is a suitable 
option for the implementation of microgrid distributed control 
system. This protocol is provided with sufficient bandwidth 
and high availability which help with the timely network 
awareness. Due to the unpredictable performance and slow-
start nature of TCP protocol, one can argue that it is not a 
suitable option for reliable monitoring and control 
applications. On the other hand, UDP based protocol is 
associated with less latency and a more reliable operation 
which is a critical factor for the microgrid control system. 
The microgrid control system can adopt wired, wireless, or 
hybrid technologies. The wired technologies like fiber optics 
have higher capacity but they are costlier to implement 
specially in larger scale microgrids. Fiber optics technology 
can support data transfer rate up to several Giga bits per 
second. The wireless technologies like high frequency radio 
benefit from the lower installation costs, flexible configuration 
and fast deployment. However, they suffer from the lower data 
transfer rates compared to wired technologies. Moreover, they 
are more prone to cyber-attacks.  
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS 
A. Case A: Model Verification for Islanded IEEE 34 Bus Test 
Feeder with 6 DERs 
Case A verifies the validity of proposed control techniques 
on the IEEE 34 bus test feeder. In Fig. 9, the single-line 
diagram of IEEE 34 bus test feeder with six integrated DERs 
is illustrated. This test system is simulated in 
MATLAB/Simulink. The original IEEE 34 bus feeder is 
transformed to a balanced feeder by averaging the line 
parameters. The specification of lines is provided in [37]. The 
specifications of DERs and loads are provided in Table I and 
II, respectively. The microgrid is operating at the frequency of 
60 Hz. The nominal line-to-line voltage is 24.9 kV. DERs are 
integrated to the feeder through a wye-wye transformer, with 
480 V/24.9 kV voltage ratings, and 400 kVA power rating. 
The series impedance of each transformer is 0.03 + j 0.12 pu. 
The microgrid critical bus is Bus 824 at which Load 1 is 
connected.  
 
Fig. 9. Islanded IEEE 34 bus feeder. 
 
Fig. 10. Communication graph of the microgrid testbed in Case A. 
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TABLE I.  SPECIFICATION OF DERS IN CASE A 
DER 1, 2, 5 and 6 DER 3 and 4 
mP 5.64×10
-5 Hz/W mP 7.5×10
-5 Hz/W 
nQ
 5.2×10-4 V/Var nQ
 6×10-4 V/Var 
Rc 30 mΩ Rc 30 mΩ 
Lc 350 µH Lc 350 µH 
Rf 100 mΩ Rf 100 mΩ 
Lf 1350 µH Lf 1350 µH 
Cf 50 µF Cf 50 µF 
KPV 0.1 KPV 0.05 
KIV 420 KIV 390 
KPC 15 KPC 10.5 
KIC 20000 KIC 16000 
TABLE II.  SPECIFICATION OF LOADS IN CASE A 
Load 1 Load 2 Load 3 Load 4 
R 1.5 Ω R 0.5 Ω R  1 Ω R  0.8 Ω 
X 1 Ω X   0.5 Ω X  1 Ω X  0.8 Ω 
The communication network graph is depicted in Fig. 10. 
This communication graph illustrates the DERs as the control 
nodes and communication links which can either utilize 
wired/wireless technologies. The frequency and voltage 
reference values are shared with DER1 with the pinning gain 
g1 = 1. ωref is set to 2π×60 rad/sec. vref is calculated using (4) 
with kp and ki parameters set to 0.01 and 10, respectively. vnom 
is set to 1 pu. The control gains c  and vc  in (9) and (10) are 
set to 40. The parameters of CLQ function in (8) are as 
follows: R1 is set to π/50; R2 is set to π/2;   is set to 5; amax is 
set to 4. sT  in (16) is set to 0.001 s and 
*
sT  in (17) and (18) is 
set to 0.0001 s. To better show the impact of cyber-attacks on 
the secondary control of microgrid and verify the validity of 
proposed cyber-secure distributed secondary control, two case 
studies, namely Case A.1 and Case A.2 are performed which 
are elaborated as follows. In both cases the distributed 
secondary frequency and voltage control protocols are applied 
simultaneously.  
Case A.1: This test case investigates the impact of an attacked 
DER on the secondary control of microgrid. The FDI attack 
takes control of DER6 and shares the constant frequency of 
60.2 Hz and constant voltage of 482V with its neighbors, i.e., 
DER1 and DER5. Assuming that the communication network 
adopts a TCP/IP based protocol, the FDI attack can take 
control of DER6 control and decision-making unit through the 
available communication ports. The impact of attack on the 
operation of conventional distributed secondary frequency 
control in (6) is shown in Fig. 11(a) and Fig. 11(b). These 
figures show the frequency of DERs and their active power 
ratios (i.e., mPiPi) before and after applying the conventional 
distributed frequency control. Microgrid islanding occurs at t 
= 0. Conventional secondary frequency control takes action at 
t = 0.6 s. As seen, the conventional distributed frequency 
control fails to restore the frequency of microgrid to 60 Hz and 
the frequency stability in the microgrid is lost. The impact of 
attack on the operation of conventional distributed secondary 
voltage control in (7) is shown in Fig. 12(a) and Fig. 12(b). 
These figures show the voltage magnitude of critical bus of 
microgrid (Bus 824) and DERs’ reactive power ratios (nQiQi) 
before and after the conventional distributed secondary 
voltage control is applied. Microgrid islanding occurs at t = 0. 
Conventional secondary voltage control takes action at t = 0.6 
s. As seen, the conventional distributed voltage control fails to 
restore the voltage magnitude of critical bus of microgrid and 
voltage stability of microgrid is lost. 
Case A.2: This test case verifies the validity of the proposed 
cyber-secure distributed secondary control. Microgrid 
islanding occurs at t = 0. Conventional secondary frequency 
and voltage control take action at t = 0.6 s. The cyber-secure 
distributed frequency and voltage control act at t = 0.65 s. 
From t = 0.6 s to t = 0.65 s, the conventional secondary control 
is impacted by the attacked DER6 which in turn affects the 
voltage and frequency restoration of microgrid.  The microgrid 
frequency and DERs’ active power ratios are shown in Fig. 
13(a) and Fig. 13 (b), respectively. The critical bus voltage 
magnitude and DERs’ reactive power ratios are shown in Fig. 
14(a) and Fig. 14(b), respectively. As seen in Fig. 13(a) and 
Fig. 13 (b), after the cyber-secure frequency control is applied, 
the frequency and active power ratio (mPiPi) of DERs 
synchronize to a common value. The DER frequencies are 
restored to 60 Hz. Additionally, the active power of DERs are 
allocated based on their active power ratings. As seen in Fig. 
14(a) and Fig. 14(b), after the cyber-secure voltage control is 
applied, the critical bus voltage magnitude is restored to 1 pu, 
and reactive power ratio (nPiQi) of DERs converge back to the 
values they had before the secondary control took action. The 
power angles of DERs and communication graph algebraic 
connectivity are shown in Fig. 15(a) and Fig. 15(b), 
respectively. As shown, after the conventional distributed 
control takes action, the power angles start to drift apart from 
each other due to the presence of false information that 
attacked DER shares with its neighbors. This results in the 
drop of algebraic connectivity of graph below the cyber-secure 
threshold. However, the cyber-secure distributed secondary 
control utilizes the control protocol in (14) to push back the 
algebraic connectivity above the cyber-secure threshold with a 
safety factor of 1.025 = . The cyber secure threshold in this 
case study is equal to 4.1. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 11. Cyber-attack impact on conventional distributed secondary frequency 
control in Case A: (a) DER frequencies; (b) DER active power ratios (mPiPi). 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 12. Cyber-attack impact on conventional distributed secondary voltage 
control in Case A: (a) critical bus voltage; (b) DER reactive power ratios 
(nQiQi). 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 13. Cyber-secure distributed secondary frequency control under attack in 
Case A: (a) DER frequencies; (b) DER active power ratios (mPiPi). 
The impact of control parameter 
2
c  on the response speed 
of (12) is studied through simulating the proposed cyber-
secure distributed secondary control with two different values 
of 
2
c . The algebraic connectivity of communication graph 
after the control protocol in (12) is applied is shown in Fig. 16. 
The control parameter 
2
c  is set to 1 and 10 in Fig. 16(a) and 
Fig. 16(b), respectively. As seen, with a larger value of 
2
c , 
the algebraic connectivity reaches the cyber-secure threshold 
faster. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 14. Cyber-secure distributed secondary voltage control under attack in 
Case A: (a) critical bus voltage; (b) DER reactive power ratios (nQiQi). 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 15. Case A with cyber-secure distributed secondary control: (a) DER 
power angles; (b) algebraic connectivity of communication graph. 
To highlight the impact of proposed cyber-secure 
distributed control on the resilience of microgrid, a resilience 
index (RI) is adopted from [14] which is defined as  
 before after
before
1 ,
PF PF
RI
PF
−
= −  (19) 
where PFbefore and PFafter denote the values of a performance 
function (PF) before and after applying the FDI attack, 
respectively. The performance index reflects system 
performance in terms of frequency and voltage restoration 
capability. The performance function for the distributed 
frequency control is defined as 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 16. Impact 
2
c  of on the response speed of (12): (a) 2c =1; (b) 
2
c =10. 
 
0
1
1 ( )
T
nom
nom
f f
PF dt
T f
−
= −  . (20) 
The performance function for the distributed voltage control is 
defined as 
  
,
0
1
1 ( )
T
c mag nom
nom
v v
PF dt
T v
−
= −  . (21) 
Table III summarizes the calculated RI and PFs before and 
after applying the cyber-attack for two different cases. In the 
first case, the conventional distributed secondary control is 
utilized. The second case uses the proposed cyber-secure 
approach. In all cases, it is assumed that microgrid is islanded 
at t = 0, and the secondary control acts at t = 0.6 s. The 
resilience index is calculated for the time interval t=[0.6s, 3s]. 
As seen, the proposed cyber-secure approach significantly 
helps with the improvement of RI.  
TABLE III.  IMPACT OF PROPOSED CYBER-SECURE APPROACH ON RI 
 Distributed Frequency Control Distributed Voltage Control 
 Conventional Cyber-secure Conventional Cyber-secure 
PFbefore 0.9982 0.9982 0.9295 0.9295 
PFafter 0.1479 0.9967 0.0833 0.9295 
RI 0.1481 0.9984 0.0896 1 
B. Case B: Model Verification for an Islanded Microgrid with 
20 DERs 
Case B verifies the validity of proposed control techniques 
on a 60 Hz and 480 V microgrid test system with 20 DERs. 
The single-line diagram of this microgrid test system is 
illustrated in Fig. 17. This test system is simulated in 
MATLAB/Simulink. The specifications of DERs are listed in 
Table IV. Lines and loads specifications are shown in Tables 
V. The microgrid critical bus is highlighted in Fig. 17 at where 
Load 6 is connected. The communication network graph is 
depicted in Fig. 18. The frequency and voltage reference 
values are shared with DER1 with the pinning gain g1 = 1. ωref 
is set to 2π×60 rad/s. vref is calculated using (4) with kp and ki 
parameters set to 4 and 40, respectively. vnom is set to 1 pu. 
The control gains c  and vc  in (9) and (10) are set to 40. The 
parameters of CLQ function in (8) are as follows: R1 is set to 
π/50; R2 is set to π/2;   is set to 10; amax is set to 40. sT  in 
(16) is set to 0.001 s and 
*
sT  in (17) and (18) is set to 0.0001 s. 
The FDI attack takes control of DER20 decision-making 
unit and shares the constant frequency of 60.2 Hz and constant 
voltage of 482V with its neighbors, i.e., DER 15 and DER 19. 
It is assumed that microgrid islanding occurs at t = 0; 
conventional secondary frequency and voltage control acts at t 
= 0.6 s; the cyber-secure distributed frequency and voltage 
control act at t = 0.62 s. From t = 0.6 s to t = 0.62 s, the 
conventional secondary control is impacted by the attacked 
DER20 which in turn affects the voltage and frequency 
restoration of microgrid.  The microgrid frequency and DERs’ 
active power ratios are shown in Fig. 19(a) and Fig. 19(b), 
respectively. The critical bus voltage magnitude and DERs’ 
reactive power ratios are shown in Fig. 20(a) and Fig. 20(b), 
respectively. As seen in Fig. 19(a) and Fig. 19(b), after the 
cyber-secure frequency control is applied, the frequency and 
active power ratio (mPiPi) of DERs converge back to a 
common value. The DER frequencies are restored to 60 Hz. 
Additionally, the active power of DERs are allocated based on 
their active power ratings. As seen in Fig. 20(a) and Fig. 
20(b), after the cyber-secure voltage control is applied, the 
critical bus voltage magnitude is restored to 1 pu, and reactive 
power ratio (nPiQi) of DERs converge back to the values they 
had before the secondary control took action. 
 
Fig. 17. Microgrid testbed with 20 DERs. 
 
Fig. 18. Communication graph of the microgrid testbed in Case B. 
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The DERs’ power angles and communication graph 
algebraic connectivity are shown in Fig. 21(a) and Fig. 21(b), 
respectively. As seen, after the conventional distributed 
control takes action, the power angles start to drift apart from 
each other due to the presence of false information that 
attacked DER shares with its neighbors. This results in the 
drop of algebraic connectivity of graph below the cyber-secure 
threshold. However, the cyber-secure distributed secondary 
control utilizes the control protocol in (14) to push back the 
algebraic connectivity above the cyber-secure threshold with a 
safety factor of 1.025 = . The cyber secure threshold in this 
case study is equal to 4.1. 
TABLE IV.  SPECIFICATION OF DERS IN CASE B 
DER 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 
13, 14, and 15 
DER 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 
18, 19 and 20 
mP 9.4×10
-5
 mP 12.5×10
-5
 
nQ
 1.3×10-3 nQ
 1.5×10-3 
Rc 30 mΩ Rc 30 mΩ 
Lc 350 µH Lc 350 µH 
Rf 100 mΩ Rf 100 mΩ 
Lf 1350 µH Lf 1350 µH 
Cf 50 µF Cf 50 µF 
KPV 0.1 KPV 0.05 
KIV 420 KIV 390 
KPC 15 KPC 10.5 
KIC 20000 KIC 16000 
TABLE V.  SPECIFICATION OF LINES AND LOADS IN CASE B 
Line 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 
13, 15, 16, 18, 19 
Line 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20 
R 0.23 Ω R 0.35 Ω 
X 0.1 Ω X 0.58 Ω 
Load 1, 3, 5, 6, 9 Load 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 
R 2 Ω R 2 Ω 
X 1 Ω X 0.5 Ω 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 19. Cyber-secure distributed secondary frequency control under attack in 
Case B: (a) DER frequencies; (b) DER active power ratios (mPiPi). 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 20. Cyber-secure distributed secondary voltage control under attack in 
Case B: (a) critical bus voltage; (b) DER reactive power ratios (nQiQi). 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 21. Case B with cyber-secure distributed secondary control: (a) DER 
power angles; (b) algebraic connectivity of communication graph. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a cyber-secure distributed secondary control 
for AC microgrids is proposed which utilizes WMSR 
technique. The proposed control uses a time-varying virtual 
communication graph. Each DER uses its own power angle 
and the power angle of its neighboring DER to calculate the 
communication link quality between them. A control protocol 
is proposed to tune up the quality of communication links such 
that the algebraic connectivity of communication graph is 
above a cyber-secure threshold to satisfy the effectiveness of 
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WMSR technique in the presence of attacked DERs. Two 
microgrid testbeds are simulated in MATLAB/Simulink to 
verify the validity of proposed cybersecure control approach. 
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